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In this study we assess the impact of the Working Income Tax Benefit (WITB) on
labour supply, GDP and income distribution in Canada, using a general equilibrium
microsimulation model. We also estimate labour supply and demand elasticities
using survey data to ensure that households’ behaviour is properly captured in the
model. Simulation results show that the WITB affects particularly labour market
participation of low- and medium-skilled lone-parents families. These positive effects
on labour supply translate into higher after-tax incomes leading to a decline in
low-income rates and low-income gaps. Our findings suggest that enhancing the
WITB could provide additional income support to working Canadian families while
reducing work disincentives for those trapped behind the welfare wall.
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In 2007 the federal government introduced a new work incentive, the Working Income
Tax Benefit (WITB), to encourage individuals to enter the workforce and to reduce
pressures on social programs. In the 2009 Federal Budget, the WITB was boosted in
order to double the fiscal relief. With a budget of $1.135 billion in 2009–10, more than
1.5 million Canadians are targeted to benefit from the enhanced WITB. Although the
total budget allocated to this program is modest, this earning supplement may entail
significant work incentives and distributional effects at the household level. Indeed a
number of studies that have examined the impact of similar earning supplements – in
partial equilibrium framework – suggest that they are likely to have positive effects on
labour supply and poverty alleviation. However, what would be the impact of these
work incentives on net labour supply if general equilibrium effects are taken into ac-
count? And what would be the impact of a rise in labour supply on low-income
earners when indirect effects, such as a decline in wage rates, are accounted for? In an
attempt to provide answers to these questions, we conduct policy simulations with a
newly developed general equilibrium model with nearly 30,000 families to assess the
net impact of this refundable tax credit on households’ labour market participation,
low-income families and income distribution. In addition, to ensure that households’Annabi et al.; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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ply elasticities by household composition and income bracket for model calibration.
Three scenarios are simulated taking into account increased work incentives for low-
income earners (Scenario 1), labour market participation of social assistance recipients
(Scenario 2), and the risk of higher marginal tax rates when this tax credit is phased-out
(Scenario 3). At the aggregate level, the results show positive but modest impacts on
labour supply and GDP, as well as a decline in low-income rates and income inequality.
At the micro level, the shocks affect particularly labour market participation of low- and
medium-skilled lone-parent families. These positive effects on labour supply translate into
higher after-tax incomes leading to a decline in low-income rates and low-income gaps.
Regarding the impact on inequality (as measured by the Gini index), we find a decline
across all household categories, especially lone parents. Finally, robustness analysis is per-
formed showing that the declines in the low-income rate and inequality at the aggregate
level are statistically significant only under Scenarios 1 and 2. Nevertheless, the results
show that all three scenarios lead to an alleviation of the low-income gap (as measured by
the amount of money by which each household falls below the low-income threshold).
We present a brief literature review on income supplements in Section 2. Sections 3
and 4 describe the main features of the model and the data used for its calibration. Policy
simulations and analysis are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
In this section we briefly review the antecedents to the WITB, such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) in the US and the Working Tax Credit (WTC) in the UK1. We also
summarise key research findings and discuss existing Canadian studies that have examined
the potential impact of earning supplements on labour supply and poverty alleviation.
Since its introduction in 1975, the EITC has been complemented or expanded a number
of times. The credit begins with the first dollar earned (phase-in), increases up to a certain
maximum (plateau), and then starts to phase-out after a given amount of earnings. The
parameters of the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges of the tax credit vary with fam-
ily composition (Holt 2006)2. According to Greenstein (2005), the EITC is the largest
anti-poverty program available to individuals of all ages in the US. The goal of the EITC is
to lift individuals above the poverty line and to encourage employment by reducing work
disincentives. However, the labour supply impact of this supplement will depend on
earned income. The impact on persons with income in the phase-in range of an earning
supplement is ambiguous as it depends on the magnitude of both the substitution and in-
come effects. On the plateau, only an income effect appears which should lead to a small
reduction in hours worked. Finally over the phase-out range, the negative income and
negative substitution effects prevail, suggesting a reduction in working hours3. The empir-
ical literature suggests that the EITC stimulates employment for single parents, particu-
larly single mothers. For instance, Eissa and Liebman (1996) examined the impacts of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, which included an expansion of the EITC. Using a difference-in-
difference estimation, the authors show that the participation rate of single women with
children has increased by 2.8 percentage points between 1984 and 1990. The increase
amounts to 6.1 percentage points for low skilled workers. In the same vein, Meyer and
Rosenbaum (1999) used a structural model of employment to examine the impacts of pol-
icy reforms between 1984 and 1996. Their results suggest that 60 percent of the observed
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number of studies have focused on evaluating labour supply responses to the EITC at the
extensive (participation) and intensive (hours worked) margins. The findings of Meyer
(2002) suggest that labour supply adjustment of single mothers mainly occur at the exten-
sive margin. At the intensive margin, the EITC clearly encourages single parents to work
in the phase-in portion. On the plateau, and particularly over the phase-out range, a
labour supply disincentives should exist and should lead to a reduction in the hours
worked. However, the author concludes that this latter effect is rather unclear. Eissa and
Hoynes (2005) discuss different factors that may explain this issue. In most cases work
schedules may be rigid, and workers often ignore the structure of the EITC schedule. Be-
sides, the empirical literature on labour supply suggests that the elasticities may be higher
at the extensive than at the intensive margin.
On the other hand, the British government introduced in the late 1990s a series of
policy reforms in order to reduce child poverty and to increase employment of families
with children. These reforms include the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) intro-
duced in 1997–1998 and the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) enacted in 1999. The
WFTC was replaced in 2003 by two new tax credits: the Child Tax Credit (CTC) and
the Working Tax Credit (WTC). The WTC is accessible to employed and self-
employed persons and aims to make work pay for low income workers. The program is
complex and differs according to worked hours, childcare allowances, disability, and
age. There is no phase-in range, but the credit is available only to those working at least
16 hours per week. Besides, the phase-out rate is steep leading to high effective mar-
ginal tax rates. Returns from the WTC program are delivered with each pay and are
considered as revenues. The impacts of these policy reforms have been examined in a
number of studies. Brewer (2003), Gregg and Harkness (2003), Blundell and Hoynes
(2004), Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004), Brewer et al. (2005), Leigh (2005), and
Brewer et al. (2010) conclude that these reforms usually lead to a positive impact on
labour force participation and labour supply, especially for single mothers. However,
the impact on the labour supply of secondary earners of couple families may be nega-
tive when their earnings are over a certain threshold.
At the provincial level, Brouillette and Fortin (2008) use an experimental approach to
examine the impacts of the working premium in Quebec (Prime au Travail) on work
effort of one person and lone parent families. The participants were asked in the exper-
iments to perform various tasks under some constraints representing different tax re-
gimes. The authors conclude that individuals respond positively to the working
premium fiscal incentives. They also suggest that final conclusions can only be obtained
with a general equilibrium model. The more recent study of Moffette et al. (2013) esti-
mates the impacts of the Quebec working premium using a microsimulation approach4.
The authors find a positive impact on aggregate labour supply, with the variation at the
extensive margin being more important than at the intensive margin. They also show
that labour supply increases for both men and women but it decreases at the intensive
margin for lone parent women.
In 2007 the Canadian government introduced the WITB to encourage individuals to
enter the workforce and to reduce pressures on social programs5. In the 2009 Federal
Budget, the WITB was boosted in order to double the fiscal relief. With a budget of
$1.135 billion in 2009–10, more than 1.5 million Canadians are targeted to benefit from
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modest, this earning supplement could produce substantial work incentives and distri-
butional effects. To our knowledge there is no existing study analysing the labour mar-
ket and income distribution impacts of the WITB. In the present research paper, we fill
this literature gap by developing a microsimulation general equilibrium model to simu-
late the impacts of this in-work tax credit on employment and low-income families.
This methodology is very appropriate as it enables assessing the impact on labour sup-
ply and income at the family level while taking into account general equilibrium effects
on wages. In addition, we estimate labour supply and demand elasticities for 25 house-
hold categories to ensure that households’ behaviour is properly captured in the model.3. Model features
We develop an integrated microsimulation computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
that draws on the contribution of Cockburn (2001) and Annabi et al. (2005), Annabi et al.
(2008), Annabi et al. (2013). The combination of general equilibrium aspects with the de-
tailed information provided by the microsimulation technique allows us to better assess
the impact of policy reforms on labour markets and income distribution6. The model is
calibrated with Canadian data for 2003. Matching and balancing (data reconciliation)
techniques are used to integrate the 29,846 economic families from the Survey of Labour
and Income Dynamics (SLID) into the general equilibrium framework. The integrated
framework employed is preferred to other approaches for linking CGE models with survey
data since it ensures that feedback effects from the micro level are fully captured at the
macro level. In the following we briefly describe the model characteristics7.
The analysis of policy simulations at the household level involves modeling sectoral
labour and capital markets which allow a better assessment of general equilibrium ef-
fects on wages and investment income8. The CGE the model includes 12 sectors pro-
ducing 17 products (goods and services) based on the Input–output (IO) tables from
Statistics Canada. Only 14 out of these 17 products are directly consumed by house-
holds. In each sector, the production of goods is represented by a Constant Elasticity of
Transformation (CET) function. This reflects the rectangular aspect of the IO tables
where each sector supplies more than one good depending on relative market prices.
Also, we adopt a nested structure for the production technology. Sectoral gross output
is a Leontief function of value-added and total intermediate consumption. Value-added
is in turn represented by a Cobb-Douglass function of capital and aggregate labour fac-
tor which is represented by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function of three
skill levels: high-, medium-, and low-skilled workers according to the National Occupa-
tional Matrix (NOC)9. Labour is assumed mobile between sectors, whereas capital is
sector-specific and is only mobile through new investments.
As in the Provincial Economic Accounts from Statistics Canada, capital income is
distributed between firms and a constant share is allocated to capital allowance. There
are two types of firms representing incorporated and unincorporated businesses. The
former receives government subsidies and interest payments from households, and pays
dividends to households and corporate taxes. The unincorporated business, which rep-
resents farm and non-farm operators, earns a share of total capital income and pays
self-employment income to households.
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from the rest of the world. They pay direct income tax to the government and transfers
to foreigners. Preferences of the 29,846 households modelled are represented by a
Stone-Geary function with minimum consumption of goods and leisure. Hence, utility
maximisation yields an Extended Linear Expenditure System (ELES) with an endogen-
ous labour supply equation for each skill level within each household. Household sav-
ings are characterised by a positive marginal propensity to save and a fixed intercept
that may be positive or negative. This specification allows initially negative savings to
become positive after a given threshold.
For a realistic representation of the Canadian economy, a foreign sector is also in-
cluded in the model to represent external trade. This feature allows us to better capture
the impact of foreign savings on capital accumulation, hence long-term effects of policy
shocks. We assume that foreign and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes. This
geographical differentiation is introduced by the standard Armingtonian assumption
with a CES function between imports and domestic goods. On the supply side, pro-
ducers make an optimal distribution of their production between exports and domestic
sales according to a CET function. We also assume a finite elasticity export demand
function. In order to increase their exports, local producers must decrease their free on
board (FOB) prices.
The public sector is represented by the federal government and a consolidated pro-
vincial and local government. Both governments collect direct tax revenues from
households and firms and indirect tax revenues on domestic and traded goods and ser-
vices. Public expenditures are allocated between the consumption of goods and services
and transfers. In each period the former component of public expenditures is adjusted
to respect a long-run closure rule consisting in fixed ratios of public saving to GDP. In
addition, we assume that foreign savings are also fixed in proportion of GDP10.
The model includes a dynamic module where capital stock is updated with a standard
capital accumulation equation involving capital depreciation rate and investment by destin-
ation. The latter is represented by an investment demand function which determines how
new investments will be distributed between sectors. This function is similar to that pro-
posed by Jung and Thorbecke (2003). In each sector, the capital accumulation rate – ratio
of investment to capital stock – is an increasing function of the ratio of the rate of return
to capital and its user cost11. The latter is equal to the dual price of investment (capital
good price) times the sum of the depreciation rate and the exogenous real interest rate.
In addition, the dynamic updating of the model includes price-indexed nominal variables
such as transfers, and exogenous volumes such as external demand for Canadian exports12.
The model is homogenous in prices and calibrated to generate a steady state where all var-
iables remain constant, which facilitates the counterfactual (i.e., simulated scenario) distri-
butional analysis13. Finally, general equilibrium is defined by the equality (in each period)
between supply and demand of goods and factors, and the savings-investment identity.
The nominal exchange rate is chosen as the numéraire in each period.
4. Model calibration
4.1. Data preparation
The sectoral structure of the model is represented by a Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM) based on 2003 Input–output tables and Provincial Economic Accounts, and the
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level according to the National Occupational Classification (NOC) matrix15. The data
for the 29,846 economic families integrated in the CGE model are based on the 2003
SLID. This survey contains detailed information on income sources, and taxes and
transfers at both the economic family and personal level. Besides, the SLID sample of
57,233 individuals may be linked to the economic family sample using families’ identi-
fiers. The link between the two samples allows disaggregating each household labour
income by skill level using information on occupations and the number of years of edu-
cation of the household members included in the person file.
The SLID also includes information on age, household composition, province of resi-
dence, and sector of activity. However, it has a shortcoming in that it does not include
information on the consumption of goods and services. To obtain detailed information
on expenditures we turn to the 2003 Survey of Households Spending (SHS), which
lacks detailed information on income sources, and employ matching techniques (see
Abadie et al. 2001) to impute consumption vectors (products) to the SLID economic
families16. First, for a given SLID observation the matching generates total consump-
tion as a function of specified household characteristics (e.g., adjusted adult-equivalent
after-tax income, size, age of reference person, province and size of region of residence)
in both the SLID and the SHS. Second, total expenditure is then disaggregated into the
consumption of various goods and services assuming that the SLID family has the same
preferences as its analogous (match) family in the SHS. Finally, as a measure of robust-
ness of the results, we compared the estimated distribution of total consumption (gen-
erated by the matching procedure) to the observed SHS distribution by computing
several income distribution indices. The similarity of both the shape of the distributions
and the various statistical indices supports the outcomes of the procedure employed.
Indeed, the differences in low-income rates and Gini indices computed with the two
distributions are found to be less than one percentage point.
Moreover, we have to produce a macro–micro consistent data set for the implemen-
tation of the model. The comparison of the totals of income and consumption vectors
at the micro level with those in the SAM reveals an undervaluation in survey data rela-
tive to the national accounts, which may be explained by underreporting. This implies
that we must reconcile these differences. To keep the structure of the economy un-
changed, we adjust household data to meet the national accounts totals. To adjust
households’ consumption and income components, we minimise the cross entropy di-
vergence measured by the Kullbak-Leibler function, as in Robilliard and Robinson
(2003), subject to the constraint of equality between the SAM cells and the total
weighted household observations values. Other minimisation criteria, such as the
standard sum of squared differences, were also tested and compared, but did not per-
form better.
The balancing procedure is the following. We begin by adjusting expenditures (con-
sumption and paid taxes and transfers) and income vectors and then check savings and
disposable income, which need to be positive or equal to zero in the model. If dispos-
able income is negative for some observations, we change the minimisation criteria. If
not, we compare poverty and inequality indices of the adjusted distribution with the
raw data distribution and keep the former if the differences are minimal. Figure 1 de-
picts the distributions of households’ net income. It indicates that the balancing
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anced”, of the “raw” distribution of net income in the survey data.
Households’ income composition based on the balanced data set is reported in
Table 1. It shows that factor income, especially labour, represents the largest source of
income for all households categories (One person, Couples, Couples with children,
Lone parents, and Other families)17. Let us focus on Couples and Lone parents families.
With a proportion of 26.2 percent in total population, Couples without children earn
55.4 percent of their income from labour especially high-, and medium-skilled labour.
The second source of income by declining order of importance is capital income (i.e.,
investment income plus self-employment income) which represents over 27 percent of
total income. Capital income includes investment income and self-employment income.
Almost 50 percent of total investment income (including pensions and registered re-
tirement saving plans withdrawals) in the economy is accruing to Couples. Regarding
Lone parents, their primary source of income is also labour income, which represents
more than 70 percent of total income, and they earn most of this income from
medium- and low-skilled occupations. In addition, Lone parents have higher shares of
households with incomes in the phase-in of the WITB and receiving social assistance
benefits. Consequently, we may expect that the simulation of the WITB will lead to a
more pronounced labour supply response among low-skilled Lone parent families in
comparison with Couples.4.2. Estimation of households’ preferences
As previously mentioned, households’ preferences are represented by a Stone-Geary
utility function with minimum consumption of goods and leisure, which yields an ELES
with a labour supply function18. The ELES has the attractive property of accommodat-
ing non-unitary income elasticities of demand but its use in CGE models involves a0
0 30,000 60,000 90,000 120,000
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Raw data – FGTo = 12.61%
Simplydistributed – FGTo = 11.18%




Figure 1 Density curves of adult-equivalent net income. Notes: FGTo denotes the share of households
with income below the low-income measure which equal to fifty percent of median income. In this figure,
“Balanced” means the reconciled or adjusted distribution using difference minimisation criteria, and “Simply
distributed” means the distribution of total income in the SAM by using the share of each household in
total income in the raw data. It is obvious that the latter alternative is the least preferable since it overesti-
mates and changes the structure of income sources by household because this procedure is implemented
for all income components which have to be consistent with national accounts.









Proportion 23.8 26.2 26.4 6.5 17.1 100
With WITB phase-
in
5.6 1.7 3.6 10.5 9.6 5.1
(26.5) (8.6) (19.0) (13.4) (32.5) 100
Social assistance
recipients
10.1 3.5 4.9 25.7 15.9 9.0*
(26.8) (10.1) (14.3) (18.5) (30.2) 100
With WITB phase-
out
26.7 9.9 9.1 20.9 29.6 17.8
(35.8) (14.6) (13.5) (7.6) (28.4) 100
Labor income 51.4 55.4 79.5 70.4 65.4
(10.7) (21.3) (46.6) (3.8) (17.6) 100
High-skilled 20.5 22.2 28.2 19.0 19.1
Medium-skilled 19.6 20.0 32.8 28.5 26.3
Low-skilled 11.3 13.2 18.5 23.0 20.0
Self-employment
income 11.1 6.3 10.7 4.9 5.2
(3.2) (3.3) (8.6) (0.4) (1.9) 17.7**
Investment income 16.8 21.3 4.1 3.1 10.5
(20.5) (48.0) (13.9) (1.0) (16.6) 100
Other income 20.7 17.0 5.8 21.6 18.9
(21.0) (31.9) (16.6) (5.8) (24.8) 100
Total (income
components) 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: See section 5 for more details on the phase-in and phase-out of the WITB. Figures in brackets represent the share
in population or in total factor income.
* The proportion of families that receive social assistance benefits and are able to enter the labour market under certain
conditions is only about 2.3 percent (see Table 3 and Scenario 2 below).
** Self-employment income represents capital income accruing to unincorporated businesses (17.7 percent). The share of
incorporated businesses is 46,7 percent, while the remaining 35,6 percent represents capital allowance. All three compo-
nents add to 100 percent.
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values of income elasticities of demand, income elasticities of labour supply, and the
Frisch parameter19. The Frisch parameter is defined as the negative value of the ratio of
total consumption (or disposable income) to discretionary consumption (i.e., total con-
sumption minus minimum consumptions) and is used to derive values for minimum
consumptions. To our knowledge, there is no existing empirical research addressing
the question of how different Canadian household categories jointly allocate their leis-
ure time and expenditures across seemingly unrelated commodities that are ultimately
interconnected through their budget constraints20. In addition, the short-run behaviour
represented by the cross-sectional data indicates non-consumed goods and zero labour
supply (income) for many families. While most existing empirical studies completely
isolated labour supply analysis, or joined leisure to a consumption of an aggregated
good, we implement an approach that allows us to take into account corner solutions
(i.e., non-consumed goods and zero labour supply)21. According to Kao et al. (2001), ap-
proaches previously used are not appropriate to study the short-run price response of
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tion for a given good can occur only if the minimum consumption of that good is negative
or zero (i.e., unnecessary good). In the case of zero labour supply, the time available for
market work is equal the maximum available time less the time for minimum leisure.
For each household type, we obtain a system of 13 equations of commodities and one
equation of labour supply. The obtained econometric model is a seemingly unrelated re-
gression with censored data (Zellner 1962). We drop one equation because of the linearity
condition on the coefficients of the model and derive the corresponding likelihood func-
tion that takes into account the zeros in consumption and labour supply. The result is a
multidimensional integral likelihood function. We adapt the algorithm of a simulated
maximum likelihood (SML) function proposed by Kao et al. (2001) to our case. The pro-
cedure uses the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator developed by Geweke
(1991), Börsh-Saupan, and Hajivassiliou (1993), Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1990), and
Keane (1994). Compared to the existing SML and Bayesian methods (Markov Chain
Monte Carlo, MCMC), the GHK appears to be robust and more efficient in terms of com-
putational time. The GHK simulator evaluates the probability each individual contributes
to the likelihood function. It switches back and forth between computing univariate trun-
cated normal probabilities, simulating draws from univariate normal distributions, and
computing normal distributions conditional on previously drawn truncated normal ran-
dom variables. We simulate 5,000 draws from univariate normal distributions. The itera-
tive maximum likelihood estimations require large amounts of time to approximate the
global maximum, especially in cases where the data presents areas of little variation (plat-
eau). We used the analytically derived gradient when the numerical computation time
was problematic23. At the computational level, we parametrise the minimum consump-
tion to ensure the positive value of virtual prices24, and take into account the frequencies
of the zero observations for each consumed good and labour supply within each group of
households. This allows us to avoid considering unnecessary goods for a small proportion
of the population in each group, as unnecessary for the whole group (i.e., consumptions
of the good by all households are equal to zero). Finally, we used the estimated parameters
to derive marginal shares and income elasticities25.
To estimate the income elasticities of demand and labour supply and Frisch parame-
ters we consider five income brackets and the same household categories discussed
above. We also exclude households with a major income earner aged 65 plus. We then
obtained 24,213 households of the 29,846 economic families of the microsimulation
model. The data shows that, for each household, the higher the income per person, the
more diversified is the basket of the consumed goods. Table 2 presents the estimated
income elasticities of labour supply for the linear expenditure system evaluated at the
sample mean by household composition and income brackets. Values of income elasti-
cities of demand and the Frisch parameters are provided in the Appendix.
Estimation results in Table 2 are consistent with economic theory and are in line with
previous findings in the literature on labour supply elasticities obtained with various
functional forms and approaches. According to the review by Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999) the range of income elasticities of labour supply in the literature is −0.95 to
−0.03. The first observation is that our estimated income elasticities are negative, highly
significant and are in the range of the previously estimated income elasticities of labour
supply in the literature. We also observe that they are higher in absolute value for
Table 2 Income elasticities of labour supply by household category
One person Couples Couples with children Lone parents Other families
Less than $15,000 −0.140 −0.263 - −0.399 −0.206
(0.004) (0.010) - (0.020) (0.008)
$35,000 to $55,000 −0.159 −0.135 −0.265 −0.249 −0.116
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
$55,000 to $100,000 −0.099 −0.062 −0.066 −0.086 −0.091
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
$100,000 to $150,000 −0.050 −0.064 −0.056 −0.079 −0.072
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
More than $150 - −0.062 −0.078 - −0.081
- (0.000) (0.001) - (0.001)
Source: Estimation results.
Notes: Standard errors are between brackets. For model calibration, labour supply elasticity for Couples with children in
the first income bracket is assumed equal to that of other families. The elasticities of the fourth income bracket are used
for families with income higher than $100,000 and where the estimation was not possible due to a small number
of observations.
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parent households (−0.39). Household’s labour supply elasticity decreases in absolute
value with income. This implies that the reaction to an increase in income tends to be
larger for households at the extensive margin than for households at the intensive mar-
gin. The income elasticity is lower in absolute value for all households with income
higher than $55,000, (i.e., at the intensive margin) and reaches 0.05.
Regarding income elasticities of demand, the findings are consistent with the under-
lying theoretical model. Depending on the various income brackets, the considered es-
sential goods have elasticities less than one, while the inessential goods and the luxury
goods have elasticity larger than one. In contrast, the Frisch parameters provide a new
insight about the minimum consumption behaviour of lower-income households.
When the Frisch parameter is near unity in absolute value, minimum consumption of
some goods may be nil or negative. In the latter case the good is deemed unnecessary
(Kao et al. 2001). This implies that almost all their income is spent on the consumption
of basic needs. In fact, model calibration reproduced the negative values for minimum
consumptions of non-consumed products for some households. Nevertheless, the esti-
mated Frisch parameters for higher income families are around −1.2, indicating that
minimum consumption is around 20 percent.
5. Policy simulations and results
The configuration of the WITB may differ according to family status, provinces and dis-
ability conditions. Provinces and territories have the flexibility to redesign or harmonise
the WITB according to their own income security programs and policies. However, varia-
tions in its design must respect several rules such as improving work incentives for low-
income earners and being cost-neutral to the Federal government. Figure 2 presents the
parameters of the WITB for One person households, Couples and Lone parents. The
credit starts after a threshold of $3,000 to ensure a minimum attachment to the labour
market and increases at a phase-in rate of 25 percent of each dollar of earned income up
to the maximum benefit. The maximum benefit is granted for incomes between $6,724














0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000
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Couples (with or 
without children) 
and Lone parents
Figure 2 The WITB by household type and income, 2010. Note: The parameters may differ by province.
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phase-out at a rate of 15 percent of each additional dollar. In order to simulate the effects of
the WITB, its parameters have to be translated in terms of changes in marginal tax rates.
An example of the impact of the WITB on the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is pre-
sented in Figure 3a and b. It shows how the EMTR decreases or increases depending on
whether the income is in the phase-in or the phase-out of the tax credit. Marginal tax rates
for persons with incomes in the plateau should remain unchanged. On the other hand,
given that the WITB is calculated on a personal basis (except for couples), the SLID per-
sonal file has been used to adjust tax rates at the family level. For example, a person aged
19 years, living with his parents and is not a full-time student is eligible for the WITB. We
have used weighted average of EMTR to account for similar cases26. As the introduction
of the WITB requires a financing source to maintain budget equilibrium, we assume in
the following scenarios that public expenditure on goods and services is adjusted to main-
tain a fixed ratio of government saving to GDP. In addition, we assume a take-up rate of
100 percent where all households entitled to the WITB would claim the benefits27.
– Scenario 1: Simulates work incentives for low-income earners taking into account
only the phase-in of the WITB with a decline in EMTR with respect to the base run.
– Scenario 2: Scenario 1 + increased labour market participation of social assistance
recipients as low-skilled workers.
– Scenario 3: Scenario 2 + risk of higher EMTR in the phase-out of the WITB.
In the simulations, social assistance recipients that are able to work must have no,
Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) income, or Old Age Security (OAS) and Guar-
anteed Income Supplement (GIS), be 19 years or older, and enter the labour market as
low-skilled. Table 3 presents the percentage of social assistance recipients able to enter
the labour force by province. We use these proportions to calibrate the labour supply
function of persons with initially zero labour supply (income), which is activated only
under Scenarios 2 and 3. The procedure used for the calibration of households with






























































Figure 3 a. Impact of the WITB on marginal tax rates – One person household with social
assistance benefits, Ontario 201028. b. Impact of the WITB on marginal tax rates – Lone parent
household with social assistance benefits, Ontario 2010.
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after-tax income – and the opportunity cost of leisure (net wage rate). The net impact
on labour supply will depend on the magnitude of these two effects. If the income ef-
fect is smaller than the price (substitution) effect, the consumer reacts to a rise in the
net wage rate by reducing leisure and increasing time devoted to work. In the opposite
situation, labour supply declines.5.1. Aggregate effects
Table 4 presents the aggregate impacts on key indicators in percentage change from
the base run. As expected, the results show that the impacts of the WITB on aggregate
labour supply and GDP are positive but modest. The largest changes are obtained
under Scenario 2 when the potential work of social assistance recipients is accounted
for. Under Scenario 3, however, both labour market participation and GDP are hardly
affected since households with benefits phase-out are taken into account in the
simulation.
Table 3 Potential labour supply of social assistance recipients, percent
Work potential Persons with long-term disability
Newfoundland and Labrador 78 22
Prince Edward Island 47 53
Nova Scotia 54 46






British Columbia 41 59
Canada 53 47
Source: HRSDC (2010), Social assistance statistical report.
Note: Proportions of work potential are distributed across households to scale down labour supply response (by reducing
the maximum time available for work) in order to avoid overestimating the positive effects of the WITB. Consequently,
the proportion of families receiving SA benefits accounted for in the simulation (Scenario 2) is reduced from 9 percent to
4.3 percent when the conditions on non-labour incomes and age are respected, and to only 2.3 percent when persons
with long-term disability are dropped from the sample.
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ticularly for low-skilled workers who are primarily targeted by work benefits30. These
changes in real wages could not be captured in a partial equilibrium framework. This
may affect the evaluation of policy reforms because labour supply depends not only on
income but also on the wage rate net of marginal tax rates. Furthermore, the higher in-
crease in labour market participation under Scenario 2 leads to a more pronounced de-
cline in low-income rates and income inequality as measured by the Gini index31. The
outcomes are different under Scenario 3, with a marginal increase in the low-income
rate and a decrease in the low-income gap. The slight increase in wage rates of high-
and medium-skilled workers is due to a negative impact on labour supply. To examine
how the shock has led to the above changes in low-income rates and inequality, Figure 4
plots the cumulative change in income by percentile. The negative slope of the depicted
curves implies that the shock benefits relatively more low-income families. Moving
from the left to the right more changes in income are added leading to a decline in
these curves which suggest that the new changes being added are smaller or in some
cases negative. The last points located on the curves are the average changes in income.Table 4 Aggregate effects, percentage change from the base run29
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Labour supply 0.15 0.21 0.04
Real GDP 0.09 0.12 0.02
Wage rate
High-skill −0.03 −0.01 0.02
Medium-skill −0.09 −0.06 0.04
Low-skill −0.14 −0.27 −0.11
Low-income rate −0.86 −1.64 0.04
Low-income gap −0.45 −1.48 −0.56















Figure 4 Cumulative income growth curves.
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decile) in particular under Scenarios 2 and 3 given that they both account for the in-
creased participation of social assistance recipients. Scenario 3, however, adversely af-
fects the remaining deciles in terms of work incentive and income, compared to
Scenario 1 and 2, as it includes the impacts of higher marginal tax rates in the phase-
out of the WITB at relatively higher income levels.5.2. Distributional effects
The results by skill level and family composition are reported in Tables 5, 6, 732. By de-
clining order of importance the two first scenarios lead to an increase in labour supply










Labour supply 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.67 0.08 0.15
High-skill 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.38 0.04 0.07
Medium-
skill
0.22 0.14 0.15 0.71 0.08 0.17
Low-skill 0.32 0.20 0.24 0.85 0.11 0.24
Labour income 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.57 −0.01 0.07
High-skill 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.35 0.01 0.04
Medium-
skill
0.13 0.04 0.06 0.61 −0.01 0.07
Low-skill 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.70 −0.04 0.10
Real after-tax
income 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.31 0.02 0.07
Low-income rate −0.23 −0.42 −3.80 −0.24 0.00 −0.86
Low-income gap −0.15 −0.38 −1.44 −0.55 −0.31 −0.45
Gini index −0.06 −0.12 −0.24 −0.32 −0.07 −0.17
Note: Income distribution indices in the base run are presented in Table 8 in the Appendix.










Labour supply 0.44 0.13 0.15 0.90 .0.15 0.21
High-skill 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.38 0.04 0.07
Medium-
skill
0.22 0.14 0.15 0.71 0.09 0.17
Low-skill 1.39 0.24 0.27 1.55 0.33 0.45
Labour income 0.34 0.04 0.06 0.78 0.04 0.11
High-skill 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.36 0.03 0.06
Medium-
skill
0.16 0.08 0.09 0.65 0.02 0.11
Low-skill 1.12 −0.03 0.00 1.28 0.06 0.18
Real after-tax
income 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.37 0.04 0.08
Low-income rate −0.17 −0.42 −3.77 −0.56 0.00 −0.89
Low-income gap −1.11 −0.74 −1.88 −1.42 −1.13 −1.21
Gini index −0.20 −0.12 −0.23 −0.46 −0.13 −0.21
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skilled Lone parents. Regarding Scenario 2, it assumes that social assistance recipients
are more likely to enter the workforce as low-skilled which benefits more Lone parents
and one person households. This is mainly due to a relatively higher proportion of
Lone parents employed in low-skilled occupations, as well as the fact that these two
household categories have a relatively higher share of their population relying on SA
(Table 1). Scenario 3, on the other hand, lowers the magnitude of the impacts on high
and medium-skilled labour supply, but the positive impact on low-skilled persists, par-
ticularly for the low-skilled Lone parents. This is not the case for Couples and Couples










Labour supply 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.04
High-skill −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
Medium-
skill
−0.03 −0.01 −0.01 −0.10 −0.02 −0.02
Low-skill 1.02 0.02 0.01 0.58 0.18 0.17
Labour income 0.22 0.00 −0.01 0.13 0.03 0.03
High-skill 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Medium-
skill
0.01 0.03 0.03 −0.06 0.02 0.02
Low-skill 0.92 −0.09 −0.10 0.47 0.08 0.07
Real after-tax
income 0.04 0.00 −0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Low-income rate 0.09 0.13 −0.07 −0.25 0.25 0.04
Low-income gap −0.85 −0.04 0.06 −0.77 −0.65 −0.56
Gini index −0.12 0.01 0.02 −0.14 −0.04 −0.01
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and particularly women are those who benefit the most in terms of income and labour
supply. However, the impacts are not comparable to the WITB since their characteris-
tics differ.
As previously mentioned, the increase in labour supply would translate into income
gains. The results show that the impacts are in line with the changes in work effort
with Lone parents and One person households benefiting relatively more in terms of
net-income under the three scenarios. The increase in after-tax income leads to a de-
cline in the low-income rate and low-income gap. However, the changes in low-income
rates are not only determined by the change in net income but also by the extent to
which families belonging to the same group are clustered around the low income meas-
ure (threshold). We also notice that the changes in the low-income rate are more pro-
nounced for Couples and Couples with children. Regarding the impact on inequality,
the Gini index declines for all household categories under Scenarios 1 and 2, and once
again the magnitude is relatively higher for Lone parents. Conversely, the impacts on
the low-income rates and inequality suggest that some households may be worse-off
under Scenario 3. Nonetheless, the low-income gap declines among all family types ex-
cept for couples with Children. In order to check whether these changes are statistically
significant, we examine in the next section the robustness of low-income incidence and
inequality comparison analysis.5.3. Robustness analysis
Given that low-income rates are sensitive to the choice of low-income measures (LIM),
we examine in what follows the difference between cumulative distribution functions
before and after the introduction of the WITB, often referred to as poverty dominance
analysis. Poverty dominance analysis is based on the cumulative distribution function
(also referred to as the FGT curve) which plots consumption or income on the horizon-
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Figure 6 Low-income rate comparison robustness.
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Figure 7 Low-income gap comparison robustness.
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assert with certainty that poverty has decreased regardless of where one draws the pov-
erty line. If however the two poverty incidence curves cross each other, we may look at
the second or third order dominance using the FGT curves for α = 1 (low-income gap)
and α = 2 (severity of low-income)33.
From Figure 6 and for a reasonable range of LIMs we may assert that the low-
income rate declines under both Scenario 1 and 2 but the effects are more statistically
significant under the latter for lower LIMs. However, we can assert that the decline is
only significant for a narrow range of low LIMs under Scenario 3, as the results suggest
that the two FGT curves cross each other at various levels. On the contrary, the robust-
ness analysis of the changes in low-income gaps presented in Figure 7 implies that the
shock leads to low-income gap alleviation wherever one draws the low-income
measure.
Finally, dominance analysis may also be applied to inequality by computing the differ-
ence between Lorenz curves (Figure 8). The Lorenz curve indicates the cumulative
share of income held by a proportion p (percentile) of the population when households
are sorted from lowest to highest income. This curve is increasing and convex since
the new incomes that are being added when p increases are greater than those that
have already been counted. If the difference between the initial and the new Lorenz
curves is positive it indicates a decrease in inequality and vice-versa. Figure 9 confirms
the above mentioned decrease in inequality among families of low-income earners and
the likely opposite effect among some households as the Lorenz curves cross each
other at some point. This implies that the change in inequality at the aggregate level
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Figure 9 Inequality comparison robustness.
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In 2007 the federal government introduced a new work incentive, the WITB, to en-
courage individuals to enter the workforce and to reduce pressures on social programs.
A number of studies that have examined the impact of such measures – in partial equi-
librium framework – suggest that similar earning supplements are likely to have posi-
tive effects on labour supply and poverty alleviation. In this study we have assessed the
impact of this refundable tax credit in Canada, using an integrated microsimulation
computable general equilibrium. The integrated approach employed enables a better
assessment of the impact of policy shocks on labour supply and income distribution as
it ensures that feedback effects, such as general equilibrium effects on wages, are fully
captured in the simulations. To that end, we have estimated for the first time an Ex-
tended Linear Expenditure System for 25 Canadian household categories. All estimated
income elasticities are highly significant and consistent with the underlying theoretical
model. In contrast, the Frisch parameter (defined as the negative value of the ratio of
total consumption to discretionary consumption) provides a new insight about mini-
mum consumptions which may be negative for some commodities deemed unneces-
sary. For higher income families, however, minimum consumption is estimated to be
around 20 percent.
Three scenarios were analysed taking into account increased work incentives for low-
income earners, labour market participation of social assistance recipients, and the risk
of higher marginal tax rates when the tax credit is phased out. At the aggregate level
simulations results suggest modest positive impacts on labour supply and GDP, as well
as a decline in low-income rates and income inequality. At the micro level, the WITB
affect particularly labour market participation of low- and medium-skilled One person
and Lone-parents families. These positive effects on labour supply translate into higher
after-tax incomes leading to a decline in low-income rates and low-income gaps. Re-
garding the impact on the Gini index, we find a decline in inequality across all house-
hold categories especially lone parents. Finally, robustness analysis is performed
showing that the declines in the low-income rate and inequality at the aggregate level
are statistically significant only under Scenarios 1 and 2. Nevertheless, the results sug-
gest that all three scenarios lead to an alleviation of the low-income gap wherever one
draws the low-income measure. These findings suggest that enhancing the WITB could
provide additional income support to working Canadian families while reducing work
disincentives for those trapped behind the welfare wall34. The model developed in the
current study could be used to examine the impact of different WITB designs (i.e., start
of the benefit, phase-in and phase-out rates and ranges) on labour supply and income
distribution.
Endnotes
1 Before April 2003, the Working Tax Credit (WTC) was merged with the Child Tax
Credit as the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC).
2 See Figure 2 for clarifications about the phase-in and the phase-out of earning
supplements.
3 For a detailed discussion see Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Eissa and Hoynes (2005).
4 According to the authors, future extensions of the microsimulation model include
the integration of general equilibrium effects by the Ministry of Finance.
Annabi et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 22 of 332013, 2:19
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/195 Previous initiatives in Canada included the self-sufficiency project which consisted
in an earning supplement offered for a limited 3-year period to individuals who found
full-time jobs and agreed to leave the income assistance program. For more informa-
tion see Ford et al. (2003).
6 For a survey on applied microsimulation techniques see Davies (2009).
7 An Appendix with a complete list of equations is available from the authors.
8 Note that the present multisectoral CGE model may be used to analyse the impact
of external shocks (e.g., decrease in world prices of manufacturing products or the in-
crease in energy prices) on labour market and income distribution (See Annabi et al.
2013).
9 We consider the NOC skill levels 0 and A as high-skilled, level B as medium-
skilled, and levels C and D as low-skilled workers.
10 This closure rule implies that all increases in income do not translate into only an
increase in consumption but also stimulate saving and investment.
11 Note that with the closure rule discussed above, a scale parameter in the invest-
ment demand function is endogenously adjusted to ensure that the savings-investment
identity is respected.
12 As in Annabi et al. (2008), Annabi et al. (2013), the current version of the model
does not include a reweighting procedure reflecting future changes in household com-
position. Blundell et al. (2013) suggest that welfare reforms may also change the returns
to education and human capital accumulation. These aspects would increase consider-
ably the complexity of the model and its numerical solution, and hence has been left
for future research. See Davies (2009) for a detailed discussion on dynamic
microsimulation.
13 The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear equations solved recursively as a con-
strained non-linear system (CNS) with GAMS/Conopt3 solver and a 64bits operating
system.
14 The general equilibrium assessment of a given policy requires using data prior to
its implementation. In addition, only Annabi et al. 2013 data was final and available
when the development of the first version of the model was initiated. A new version of
the model calibrated to 2006 data is in progress. However, this would not affect the
conclusions of the current study as the structure of the economy is expected to remain
similar during such a short period.
15 A detailed description of the sectors and commodities included in the model may
be found in Annabi et al. (2013).
16 Matching may be used in the opposite situation. In implementing their microsimu-
lation CGE model to Russia, Rutherford and Tarr (2008) used this approach to estimate
income sources for 55,098 households.
17 Aggregating households may be a useful strategy in explaining simulation results.
However, one should keep in mind that each group may be very heterogeneous which
prevents the link between the base-run characteristics and the aggregated results from
being straightforward.
18 For estimation purposes we restrict the econometric model to an aggregate leisure
demand (labour supply) at the household level as we assume a unitary model of labour
supply. Estimation of labour supply elasticities at the individual level or by skill level re-
quires a larger data set and is beyond the scope of the current study.
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ternatively, one can use the price elasticities of demand. See Annabi (2003), Annabi
et al. 2006 for details.
20 Studies about joint determination of labour supply and consumption are spread
across countries and are very selective. See Green et al. (1978) for Canada, Blundell and
Walker (1982) or Jorgenson and Slesnick (2008) for the US, and Asano (1997) for Japan.
21 See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for literature review. Most studies in this review
focused on issues related to the intensive and extensive margins of work, while specific-
ally controlling for gender, and other demographic or socioeconomic factors.
22 Models such as the Almost Ideal Demand System (Barnett and Seck 2006, Deaton
and Muellbauer 1980), the Rotterdam model (Barten 1964), or the Translog model
(Christensen et al. 1975, Srinivasan and Winer 1994) assume interior solutions and ig-
nore the censoring of data. The Stone-Geary utility function is a better choice to cap-
ture this behaviour.
23 We also concentrated the likelihood function, and reduced the number of parame-
ters given that the variance covariance parameters are not our priority in this study
(see Amemiya 1985 and Greene 1993).
24 The virtual price is the price the consumer is willing to pay for a given good and is
always less than the actual price.
25 Standard errors were obtained using the delta method. See Appendix for a brief
description of the econometric model.
26 EMTR have been generated with the MAPSIT model. For more details, see Morri-
son (1990).
27 Contrary to the EITC, currently we do not have any information on the actual
take-up rate of the WITB.
28 The current design of the WITB in Ontario does not include a plateau represent-
ing the range for maximum benefits; See Chan et al. (2009) page 7.
29 Income distribution indices in the base run are presented in Table 8 in the Appendix.
30 In the absence of any complementary measure on the demand side, the increase in
labour supply leads to a decline in real wages with respect to the benchmark equilibrium.
31 Low-income rate represents the share of households with income below the low-
income measure, which is equal to fifty percent of median adjusted net income. Low-
income gap is the amount of money by which each household’s income falls below the
threshold. More details on income distribution indices are presented in the Appendix.
32 Distributional analysis is performed using DASP (Araar and Duclos 2009) and
DAD (Duclos and Araar 2004).
33 For more details on poverty and inequality dominance analysis, see Duclos and
Araar (2004), Araar et al. (2007), Bibi and Duclos (2009), and Chen and Duclos (2011).
34 Battle (2009) suggests that the WITB should gradually improve over time in order
to become a major income support for working poor Canadians. On the other hand,
Chan et al. (2009) recommend several modifications to the WITB in order to increase
work incentives and to be more consistent with social programs in Ontario. To increase
participation rates and full-time work, the authors suggest moving up the start of the
credit, decreasing the phase-in rate, lowering the maximum benefit, and lastly changing
the phase-out rate to remain cost-neutral with respect to the current program.
35 The full income is defined as the total of labour and non-labour income.
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Micro-econometric model
Let Ch = (Ch,1,…,Ch,m) be the consumption vector of m goods by a household of type h
and P = (p1,…, pm) the corresponding price vector. Denote by Lh and wh the leisure time
and the wage rate, and let YF,h be the full income
35. The utility of each household Uh(Ch, Lh)
takes the form of a Stone-Geary function and the corresponding optimisation problem is










pjCh;j þ whLh≤YF;h ;
Xm
j¼1
αh;j þ βh ¼ 1;j ¼ 1;…;m; and h ¼ 1;…;H
ð1Þ
where Cminh;j and L
min
h represent household’s h minimum consumption of good j and leis-
ure time respectively. The parameters αh,j and βh represent marginal budget shares, and
they should be strictly positive for at least some of the essential goods such as food or
clothing. Estimates of model parameters are also used to derive income elasticities and
the Frisch parameter (See Table 9). The total number of households is denoted by H. We
also assume that the inter-group preferences are explicitly additive over Uh. Then the
overall utility function will have the same form as in (1) with an additional product sign
indexed from 1 to H. The analysis of all the groups can be simplified then to the analysis
of a single group h. Without loss of generality, reorder the good vector so that the first
ℓ ≥ 0 elements correspond to zero consumption, i.e., Ch = (0,…, 0,Ch,ℓ + 1,…,Ch,m), and the
remaining goods are indexed 1 + 1 through m. Include leisure time in the consumption
vector and let P = (p1,…, pj − 1,wh, pj + 1,…, pm) be the corresponding vector price. The
Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions for the consumption of goods are:
αh;j
Ch;j−Cminh;j
 −λpj≤0 for j ¼ 1;…; ℓ
αh;j
Ch;j−Cminh;j
 −λpj ¼ 0 for j ¼ ℓþ 1;…;m ð2Þ
and for labour supply:
βh
Lh−Lminh
 −λwh≤0 if Lh ¼ 0
βh
Lh−Lminh
 −λwh ¼ 0 if Lh > 0 ð3Þ
The corresponding interior solutions defining the Extended Linear System (ELES) are




























where LSh−Maxhourh ¼ − Lh−Lminh
 
. LSh and Maxhourh represent labour supply and
the maximum available time when the minimum leisure time is consumed. The budget
share of a given commodity is given by:





; j ¼ 1;…;m; and i ¼ 1;…;m ð5Þ
The KT solutions can equivalently be expressed in terms of virtual prices (Neary and
Roberts, 1980). The virtual prices for the non-consumed goods and leisure are the
prices the consumer is willing to pay for a given good or leisure and are always lower










=λ ¼ − βh
LSh−Maxhourhð Þ =λ≤wh
ξ j≤pj and ξL≤wh for j ¼ 1;…; ℓ and ξ j ¼ pj for j ¼ ℓþ 1;…;m
ð6Þ















The non-negativity constraint on the parameters α is imposed by the following form:αh;j ¼ eεh;j ð8Þ
where εh(εh,1, εh,2,…, εh,m) are error terms and are normally distributed with means γh
(γh,1, γh,2,…, γh,m) and a constant variance-covariance matrix ∑. We apply the
normalisation εh,m = 0 and preserve the condition
Xm
j¼1




























piCh;i and sL ¼ whLShYh . After logarithmic transformations of the virtual
prices in (11), we have:













; j ¼ 1;…;m












; j ¼ l þ 1;…;m








for LSh ¼ 0








for LSh > 0
g ð12Þ
The error terms are defined as follows:e1;h ¼ εh;1−γh;1;…; εh;l−γh;l
 T
e2;h ¼ εh;ℓþ1−γh;ℓþ1;…; εh;m−1−γh;m−1
 T ð13Þ
and the shares of the consumption goods are defined as s2,h = (sh,ℓ + 1,…, sh,m − 1).
The likelihood contribution function of a household h for an observation xi,h in each
of consumption regime k (positive or null) is:
Lh;k xi;h
  ¼ ∫η: η≤r f ηh dηh f e2;h  ∂e2;h∂s2;h

 ð14Þ
























  Ii kð Þ ð16Þ
where Ii(k) indicates to what regime the households is switching and takes the value of
Ii(k) = 1, if the observation consumption pattern xi,h for an individual i in the category
of household h is in the demand regime k, and Ii(k) = 0 otherwise.
Since var ηh
  ¼ Ωh≡Σ11h−Σ12;hΣ−122;hΣ21;h for the ELES from (14) is positive defin-
ite, there exists a lower diagonal Choleski matrix with positive diagonal elements
such that AA ’ =Ωh. Define a transformation ζh =A
− 1ηh. The transformed random
variable ζh becomes a standard multivariate normal variable. The likelihood func-
tion in (14)becomes:
Lh;k xi;h











where ϕ(ζh,i) is the standard normal density of ζh,i, ζh = (ζh,1,…, ζh,ℓ). The bounds
in the integral are –∞ < Aζh ≤ r and the resulting likelihood function is:



























Now, transform the domain of integration to the unit interval of dimension1 by de-fining the truncated standard normal density as φDi ζhð Þ ¼ φ ζhð ÞΦ aið Þ ; where
ai ¼ a−1ll rl−al1ζh;1−al2ζh;2−…−al;l−1ζh;l−1
 
with i = 1,K…, 1 and the domain Di =
(–∞, ai] as a support of the density function. The likelihood function becomes:
Lh;k xi;h


















Transforming the truncated normal random variables into uniform random variablesui;h ¼ Φ ζ i;hð ÞΦ aið Þ with ξi,h ≤ ai for i = 1, K…, 1; where ξi,h is the virtual price of good i. Condi-
tional on ζh,1,…, ζh,i − 1, generate the uniform random variable ui,h on [0, 1], through the
inverse distribution transformation of ζi,h. This transformation defines a sequence of
conditional uniform random variables. Once ui,h are drawn from a uniform random
generator, ζ ’ s can be found recursively as functions of the drawn u’s ζi,h =Φ
− 1[ui,
hΦ(ai)] with the starting value as ζ1;h ¼ Φ−1 u1;hΦ r1a11
 h i
. This transformation allows
changing the bounds of the integral into zero–one limits. With the realisation of R ran-
dom draws, the likelihood at a sample observation xnobx,h can be simulated as:
Lh;k xnobs;h
















where nobs = 1,…..,Nobs is the index for the number of observations, and Nobs is the
total number of observations.
The total likelihood function for all the observations for the household h is:



















for nobs = 1,…,Nobs.
Low-income and inequality indices
Low-income indicators are computed using the Foster et al. (1984) class of indices
(FGT) based on a low-income threshold (measure) equal to fifty percent of the median
adjusted net income. The adjusted net income is the ratio of net income to an adult-
equivalent scale which is assumed equal to the square root of the family size. The FGT
index is defined as











; i ¼ 1; 2;…;H ;…;N
WhereN: Total number of households




yi: Adult-equivalent after-tax income
The higher the value of α, the greater the weight given to low-income house-
holds. When α = 0 the index FGT0 measures the low-income rate, also known as
the headcount ratio, which is equal to the ratio of the number of households
(individuals) below the low-income measure to the total population. If α = 1 we
obtain the low-income gap (depth) which measures the amount of money (in
proportion of the low-income measure) by which each household falls below the
threshold. One can also compute the severity of poverty assuming α = 2. In this
case more weight is given to the lowest income and hence to the largest income
gaps.
Regarding inequality, the most common measure is based on the Gini index which
can be computed using different methods. Geometrically the value of the index can be
calculated using the Lorenz curve (Figure 8). This curve shows the cumulative share of
income held by a given proportion of the population. The value of Gini is equal to the
ratio of the area between Lorenz curve and the perfect equality line to the area below
this line (diagonal). Gini index ranges between 0, where each member of the population
earns the same amount of income, and 1 where all income is held by only one member.
The simplest numerical approach for computing the gini index is based on the relative











income 60542 117605 258545 22741 101165 560598
High-skill 22915 43307 90757 5967 28531 191477
Medium-
skill 23657 45141 104549 9245 41146 223738
Low-skill 13970 29157 63239 7529 31489 145384
After-tax
income 98830 174917 267456 33387 131911 708504
Low-income
rate 0.28 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.12 0.10
Low-income
gap 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03
Gini index 0.41 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.33
Table 9 Income elasticities of demand and Frisch parameters by household category
Less than $15,000 $15,000 to $35,000 $35,000 to $55,000 $55,000 to $100,000 $100,000 to 150,000
OP CO CC LP OT OP CO CC LP OT OP CO CC LP OT OP CO CC LP OT OP CO CC LP OT
Number of
observations
1053 128 20 136 542 2169 1537 1026 1015 1365 777 2094 2686 507 1467 265 1476 3336 254 958 13 226 639 12 193
Agriculture and
forestry
0.11 0.19 - 0.09 0.14 4.86 3.24 2.54 0.17 3.73 6.34 3.45 3.70 4.25 4.83 10.14 4.64 3.40 3.76 5.70 - 3.45 8.76 - 8.89
(0.00) (0.03) - (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) - (0.01) (0.05) - (0.07)
Other mining 4.96 2.00 - 6.67 9.76 5.20 6.11 3.65 7.29 4.41 15.45 5.58 9.25 12.51 5.54 12.20 7.31 6.11 7.30 13.10 - 5.58 14.50 - 14.30
(0.03) (0.24) - (0.58) (0.39) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.07) (0.33) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.02) (0.35) (0.06) (0.02) (0.11) (0.15) - (0.03) (0.16) - (0.11)
Food, drink and
tobacco
0.10 0.20 - 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.59 0.60 0.17 0.65 1.17 0.85 0.88 0.93 1.16 1.22 1.18 0.92 1.03 1.16 - 0.85 1.97 - 1.75
(0.00) (0.03) - (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) - (0.00) (0.01) - (0.01)
Textiles and clothing 6.62 0.30 - 3.95 4.80 5.94 2.06 3.16 0.15 6.90 1.81 2.07 1.77 0.51 1.67 2.33 2.03 2.00 1.91 1.95 - 2.07 1.03 - 1.29
(0.02) (0.04) - (0.44) (0.31) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) - (0.01) (0.01) - (0.02)
Lumber and wood 10.54 17.48 - 0.07 0.11 2.50 20.23 3.05 0.11 4.45 14.43 7.31 4.38 13.02 11.93 9.89 7.14 9.03 8.95 5.59 - 7.31 4.39 - 10.09
(0.26) (1.12) - (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.58) (0.06) (0.00) (0.12) (0.63) (0.18) (0.09) (0.37) (0.35) (1.01) (0.24) (0.15) (0.66) (0.18) - (0.18) (0.22) - (0.57)
Refined and other
petroleum products
7.30 0.00 - 7.12 4.62 2.40 0.58 1.79 6.23 2.24 1.22 2.08 2.34 2.30 0.96 2.33 2.96 2.61 2.98 2.71 - 2.08 1.62 - 1.66
(0.14) (0.00) - (0.32) (0.24) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) - (0.01) (0.01) - (0.02)
Machinery, motor
vehicles and parts
34.75 20.91 - 33.82 1.07 4.86 5.49 6.44 16.23 5.95 2.10 1.31 4.13 1.73 2.19 0.89 0.56 0.81 0.73 1.30 - 1.31 1.12 - 1.26
(5.91) (1.19) - (12.09) (0.05) (0.35) (0.41) (0.54) (1.29) (0.57) (0.13) (0.06) (0.16) (0.14) (0.11) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) - (0.06) (0.04) - (0.08)
Other manufactures 0.30 0.18 - 0.10 0.13 1.24 1.16 1.18 0.16 1.25 1.19 1.61 0.77 1.54 0.71 0.96 1.95 1.69 1.71 0.80 - 1.61 1.43 - 1.24
(0.00) (0.02) - (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) - (0.01) (0.01) - (0.02)
Utilities 1.23 2.57 - 2.43 3.94 1.41 0.58 0.99 2.01 1.16 3.98 3.40 2.74 1.85 3.10 4.84 4.45 3.76 4.44 3.88 - 3.40 3.29 - 3.08
(0.01) (0.24) - (0.20) (0.14) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.14) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) - (0.06) (0.05) - (0.24)

















Table 9 Income elasticities of demand and Frisch parameters by household category (Continued)
Transportation and
storage
(0.04) (0.53) - (0.50) (0.17) (0.07) (0.13) (0.18) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.14) (0.03) (0.42) (0.06) (0.05) (0.19) (0.12) - (0.10) (0.06) - (0.22)
Social services 10.03 8.76 - 10.10 7.68 3.04 3.31 3.42 7.48 2.50 3.16 4.24 3.24 1.68 2.56 4.21 6.47 3.47 2.34 3.13 - 4.24 2.15 - 4.00
(0.61) (0.34) - (1.82) (0.47) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.30) (0.21) (0.06) (0.17) (0.18) - (0.00) (0.00) - (0.00)
Wholesaling and
retailing margins
0.11 0.16 - 0.17 0.15 0.56 0.45 0.38 0.15 0.53 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.67 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.48 - 0.44 0.39 - 0.41
(0.00) (0.03) - (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) - (0.00) (0.00) - (0.00)
Other services 0.11 0.21 - 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 - 0.09 0.09 - 0.08
(0.00) (0.03) - (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) - (0.00) (0.00) - (0.00)
Frisch parameter 1.02 −1.05 - −1.03 −1.06 −1.08 −1.10 −1.09 −1.07 −1.09 −1.07 −1.09 −1.07 −1.21 −1.11 −1.22 −1.08 −1.13 −1.16 −1.11 - −1.09 −1.22 - −1.29
(0.00) (0.01) - (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.56) (0.01) (0.03) (0.24) (0.23) (0.02) (0.05) (0.47) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.80) - (0.12) (0.79) - (0.16)
Source: Estimation results.
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 ⋅ niwið Þ⋅ njwj  ; i; j ¼ 1;…N
where
y : Weighted average of adult-equivalent after-tax income




The denominator on the right hand side represents a normalisation factor ac-counting for the average net income and population size. The index is also di-
vided by two because all income differentials are counted twice in the double
summation over all households. Table 8 presents low-income rates and gaps as
well as the value of Gini coefficients by family type in the base run.
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